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A sample of 58, 6 to 12 year-old children drawn from admissions to a local
psychiatric hospital were read stories depicting acts of victimization and questioned about
how both victims and victimizers would be feeling. Participants were randomly assigned
to either imagine themselves as victimizers in the stories, or victimizers were presented as
hypothetical characters. Acts of both physical and psychological harm were portrayed in
which the victimizer either obtained a tangible gain or no gain was received. Children in
the self-as-victimizer condition attributed fewer positive emotions and gave more moral
rationales than did children in the hypothetical condition who attributed more positive
emotions and gave fewer moral rationales. Children also required more probe questioning
to attribute negative emotions in the hypothetical condition than in the self-as-victimizer
condition. More positive emotions were attributed to hypothetical victimizers for stories
of gain versus no gain; however, no distinction between gain versus no gain was found for
the self-as-victimizer condition. No developmental effect was found for the positive
emotions attributed in either the self-as-victimizer condition or the hypothetical condition.
In the self-as-victimizer condition children of all ages attributed primarily negative
emotions, while in the hypothetical condition children were more likely to attribute
positive emotions across all age levels. In addition, no developmental effect was found for
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the rationales attributed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A considerable amount of research has looked at how children's cognitive
processes guide their behavior in social situations. However, the influence of children's
emotions upon their behavior has been underemphasized (Arsenio & Lover, 1995; Harris,
1983; Strayer, 1986). Harris (1983) pointed out that the importance of adults' emotional
states for their judgements in social situations has been recognized. In their review of the
literature, Arsenio and Lover (1995) noted that recently, many have questioned the
necessity of separating research on affect and cognition. They argue that affect and
cognition interact in children's evaluations of social situations.
Understanding the emotional expectancies children hold is important for those
studying moral development (Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Arsenio & Lover, 1995; NunnerWinkler & Sodian, 1988). Children often encounter everyday situations in which they
must make a choice that has moral implications. For example, a child notices another
child on a swing that he wants. All of the remaining swings are occupied. He decides to
push the other child off the swing and take the swing for himself (Arsenio & Kramer,
1992). How the child expects to feel after pushing the other child off the swing can
influence his willingness to engage in the act or repeat the act in the future. If the child
feels happy because he got the swing for himself, he may be more likely to repeat the
behavior, but if he feels sad or guilty, he may decide against it (Arsenio &
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Lover, 1995). Piaget was one of the first to emphasize that affect and cognition are
interrelated (Piaget, 1954/1981). In his theory on moral development, he pointed out the
importance of children's social experiences. According to Piaget, interactions with peers
help children to better understand the perspectives of others. He described a series of
moral development stages through which children progress. In the first stage, children
between the ages of six and ten years develop a strong respect for the rules of authority
figures. During this stage children believe in the idea of "immanent justice." This idea
carries the indication that people can not escape punishment if they violate moral rules.
However, when children enter the next stage, they begin to realize that social rules are not
absolute. They begin to understand that rules can be challenged. Piaget believed that this
stage occurred by the age of ten or eleven years. Piaget emphasized that for the transition
between the stages to occur, children's cognitive and social abilities must mature. He also
felt that interactions with peers provided the necessary social experiences to stimulate
these changes.
Recent research has brought into question Piaget's idea of "immanent justice." Do
children expect all violations to be punished even if the acts go undetected? A number of
studies have shown that children reported feeling happy after acts of undetected
dishonesty (Barden, Zelko, Duncan, & Masters, 1980; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988);
this expectation has been called the "happy victimizer effect." If the children expected the
acts to be punished, a reaction of fear or sadness would be more logical. These results
suggest that it is important to examine children's expectations regarding the emotional
consequences of responses to moral dilemmas.
Kohlberg (1984) expanded on Piaget's theory by describing a sequence of stages

3

that children progress through after ten or eleven years. Kohlberg presented children with
moral dilemmas to find out how they would reason. One of Kohlberg's best-known
dilemmas is about a woman who is dying of cancer and needs a special type of drug sold
only at an expensive price by a druggist. The woman's husband does not have the money
to pay for the drug, but the druggist refuses to sell it for a cheaper price. The husband
then must decide whether to steal the drug for his wife. Kohlberg asked children what
decision the husband should make and why. He was not interested in what they thought
was the right thing to do, but how they reasoned about the situation.
Kohlberg did not take emotions into account in his theory. Clearly, the actions of
the husband could have been motivated by powerful emotions. While Kohlberg's theory
has been influential in moral development, it is lacking because it overlooks the role
emotions play.
Children's Emotional Understanding
Children use their emotions to guide their behavior in a wide array of situations
(Arsenio, 1988; Arsenio & Lover, 1995; Harris, 1983). Many of these situations have
moral implications, while others are just ordinary social events. Harris (1983) was
interested in finding out how children expect these ordinary events will make them feel.
He asked six and ten-year-old participants how a story character would feel if his bike
were scratched or his pet dog were ill. Some of the stories were likely to arouse either a
neutral reaction, mild sadness, or intense sadness. The participants were then asked how
the child in the story would feel at various points in the day after the situation occurred
(i.e., later that morning, that afternoon, that evening, and the following morning). Harris
found that both the younger and older children expected the emotion to persist after the
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situation was over. Both age groups anticipated that the emotion would gradually wane
over time.
In the second part of the study, participants were read stories about situations that
would provoke conflicting emotions. For example, one story was about a child opening a
Christmas gift and then having it snatched away by a younger brother. This type of
situation could make the child feel happy that he got a gift but angry that his brother took
it. The majority of children in both age groups denied that two conflicting emotions
could occur at the same time. They did not think it was possible that the child in the story
could feel both happy and angry at the same time.
The third part of the study was a combination of the previous two parts. Children
were read stories in which a negative situation was followed by a positive situation.
Participants were asked if a negative emotion aroused from an earlier situation could
persist and be experienced along with a positive emotion aroused by a later situation. He
found that participants from both age groups acknowledged that the child in the story
could be feeling both negative and positive emotions following the two situations. In part
two, participants denied that a single situation could produce conflicting emotions.
However, the third part of the study revealed that participants did admit that conflicting
emotions could be experienced when a negative situation was followed by a positive
situation.
Strayer (1986) also looked at how children's emotional conceptions change with
age. In her study she interviewed four to five-year-olds, seven to eight-year-olds, and
adults to determine what types of situations they expected would make people feel
emotions such as happiness or sadness. She predicted that with age, negative emotions
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such as sadness or anger would increasingly be explained by interpersonal reasons because
of increased socialization. However, she expected that positive emotions would be
explained by more impersonal reasons such as material gain. It was also expected that
achievement reasons would increase with age because of greater demands in school.
Participants in the study were asked to indicate what would make them feel
"happy, sad, angry, afraid or surprised." Adults were also asked to judge what would
make children feel the various emotions, and children were asked to make predictions for
the adults. The adults were fairly accurate in their predictions for children. However, the
children were not so accurate; they did not differentiate between their own experiences
and those of the adults. Overall, the results followed the predictions made. With age,
there was an increase in interpersonal themes to explain anger and sadness. Happiness and
surprise were increasingly explained by material and event explanations. As Strayer
notes, the results suggest that children learn to identify particular emotions with certain
types of situations.
The work of Harter and Buddin (1987) and Harter and Whitesell (1989) supports
a developmental pattern of how children understand emotions. Their research suggests
that children must progress through a series of stages before they come to the
understanding that a person can experience two conflicting emotions at the same time.
Based on the research of Piaget, they reasoned that if children have trouble integrating
two physical judgments such as height and weight, then it is possible they will have
problems integrating two emotions, especially if these emotions were oppo sites.
Interviewing 126 children from the ages of four to twelve years, Harter and
Buddin (1987) found that as children develop, they progress through a series of five levels
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of understanding emotion. However, they noted considerable age variability within each
level. Children seemed to progress through the different levels at an individual pace. Two
dimensions were used to describe the levels: the valence of each emotion and the target of
each emotion. At the lowest level, level zero, children completely denied that two
emotions could occur at the same time. They might say that two emotions such as
happiness and anger could occur one right after the other, but they firmly believed that the
two emotions could not coexist. The mean age for this level was 5.2 years. At level one,
children began to acknowledge that two emotions of the same valence could occur at the
same time that were directed at the same target. Harter and Whitesell (1989) give the
example of a boy feeling both happy and glad he got a new puppy. The mean age for this
level was 7.3 years.
At level two, children progressed to the understanding that two same-valence
emotions could be directed toward different targets at the same time. For example, a child
could feel happy that he got an "A" on his test and glad he could take it home to show his
parents. However, at this stage children still denied that two emotions of different valence
could occur at the same time. The mean age for this level was 8.7 years.
At level three a major advancement occurred. For the first time children
acknowledged that a person could feel opposite emotions directed at different targets. An
example which Harter and Whitesell note is that a child could feel both mad at his brother
for hitting him but happy that his father gave him permission to hit him back. The mean
age for this level was 10.1 years.
At level four, the final stage in the sequence, children finally understood that two
emotions of opposite valence could be experienced at the same time and directed toward
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the same target. An example would be a child feeling happy that he got a new toy car but
sad that it was not the model he wanted. The mean age for this stage was 11.3 years.
The Emotion Event-Link
Arsenio and Lover (1995) point out that social situations with moral implications
produce especially powerful emotional consequences for children. They introduced a
four-step model of how children begin to link emotions to particular types of sociomoral
events. In step one of their model, children experience and witness different types of
sociomoral events that cause a variety of emotional reactions. In step two, children begin
to learn that similar types of events would cause them to feel the same way. For example,
children might come to expect that when someone took their toys, they would feel angry
or sad, and when toys were shared, they would feel positive emotions. In step three
children use the knowledge they gained to anticipate the consequences of their behavior
and to guide their behavior. In future situations, children might decide to share toys
instead of taking toys from other children because they could anticipate the emotional
consequences of these alternatives. Finally, in step four children begin to use the
knowledge they gained to form general sociomoral principles. The children may have
formed the principle that taking others' belongings without their permission is wrong or
that sharing toys is fair.
Arsenio (1988) explored how children learn to link emotions with different types
of sociomoral events. Six categories of sociomoral events were used. It was expected
that children would use their knowledge of how they felt in these types of situations in the
past to predict how they would feel in the same types of situations in the future. One
category was inhibitive morality, which involved acts of victimization in which one child is
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deprived of his rights (e.g., one child pushes another child off his swing and then takes the
swing for himself). In the active morality category, events were characterized by one
child intervening to prevent another child from unfairly hurting a third child. The third
category was conventional morality. Events in this category promoted the smooth
functioning of social groups. The next category was personal morality. Events in this
category only affected the child involved, and were usually viewed as outside moral and
conventional regulations. The fifth category was distributive justice. These events
involved the distribution of group-earned resources. The last category was prosocial
morality. These events were ones in which the child used her own private resources to
help another child. An example would be a child helping another child pick up a game that
was dropped.
Arsenio (1988) studied kindergarten, third-grade, and fifth-grade students.
Participants were read brief stories depicting each of the six different types of sociomoral
events. They were then asked to assess the emotional consequences of these events for
both participants and observers. It was expected that children would differentiate between
the different types of events. This expectation is exactly what was found. Children were
sensitive to differences in the types of sociomoral events. The emotional consequences
predicted ranged from very positive for acts of prosocial morality to very negative for acts
of inhibitive morality. They were also sensitive to the types of roles individuals played
within these events. Both prosocial morality and distributive justice events were judged as
having positive consequences for both the actor and the recipient of the action. However,
for inhibitive morality, it was expected that the actor would feel positively and that the
recipient and observer would feel negatively. There were no significant age-related
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changes for how the children viewed the events.
In part two of Arsenio's (1988) study, participants were given the emotional
reactions of the characters in the story and were asked to predict the type of sociomoral
event that caused them to feel that way. It was predicted that children would use their
knowledge about the different types of events to infer which type of event caused the
emotional reaction. As age increased, the level of accuracy increased. However, all age
groups performed at better than chance levels. Clearly, children can use both parts of the
emotion-event link. They can either start with the situation or the emotion to make
inferences. Another interesting finding was that children who did poorly on the first task
also tended to do poorly on the second task. Essentially, children whose affective
conceptions differed from the norm in the first task were unable to match emotions in the
second task with the appropriate sociomoral events. As Arsenio (1988) pointed out, this
finding raises an important question about how children with atypical affective conceptions
reason about the emotional consequences of sociomoral events. Do children with
abnormal emotional expectancies foresee their actions as having results different from
those of children with normal emotional expectancies?
Children With Abnormal Emotional Conceptions
Arsenio and Fleiss's (1996) study compared the moral reasoning of behaviorally
disruptive (BD) and typical children. It was hypothesized that BD children would differ in
their emotional expectancies because of problems with peer aggression and social limits.
The following sociomoral events were used: inhibitory, conventional, personal, and
prosocial morality. It was also expected that differences between the two groups might
depend on the type of sociomoral event being assessed.
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Seven- and ten-year-old participants were individually interviewed and read stories
depicting each of the four sociomoral events used. They were asked to give an emotion
judgment for each character in the story, and to give a reason for their choice. Differences
were found between the emotion judgments of BD children and normal children for four
types of sociomoral events. The most pronounced differences were for acts of prosocial
and inhibitory morality. BD children expected the victims in the inhibitory events to feel
more sadness and less fear than the normal children did. BD children also explained the
victimizers' emotions with more references to the material gains the acts produced. For
acts of prosocial morality, BD children attributed more positive emotions to the
characters, especially for the recipients of the actions, than did their normal peers. At first
it would appear that attributing positive emotions would promote prosocial behavior in
BD children, but the reasons behind their emotion choices are revealing. BD children
explained the emotion with more references to the fact that the actor had avoided unfairly
harming or victimizing the recipient and with fewer references to the positive
consequences for the recipient. Clearly the results of this study indicate that BD children
have different emotional expectancies than do their peers. These emotional expectancies
may influence how they behave in sociomoral situations.
Smetana et al. (1999) compared the emotional reasoning of both maltreated and
nonmaltreated preschoolers. They examined how children reason about both hypothetical
scenarios and "actual" events occurring in their everyday lives. Participants were from
three to five years of age, and the maltreated group was from a center serving low income
children who had been referred from the Department of Social Services. The maltreated
children were also classified as to whether they were physically abused or neglected. The
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nonmaltreated children were from two daycare centers and one kindergarten serving
mostly low income families. None of the nonmaltreated children had been abused
according to DSS records and all were from low income families receiving some type of
public assistance.
There were two different conditions; in one condition, children were asked about
hypothetical events and in the other about actual events. In the hypothetical condition,
participants were presented with brief scenarios of transgressions and then asked questions
in a fixed order. First, they were asked about how the victimizer would feel, and then they
were asked about the victim. In the actual events condition, children were interviewed
about naturally occurring events in their classrooms. The transgressions chosen were
either aggression, psychological harm, or object disputes. Only transgressions in which a
response from a teacher or a peer was obtained were used. Interviewers observed until a
transgression fitting their criteria was obtained. Then they interviewed both the victim and
victimizer immediately after the transgression occurred, if possible. A child was
interviewed a maximum of two times for each type of transgression both as a victim and as
a victimizer, for a maximum of twelve actual event interviews per participant.

Not all

children were interviewed either as a victim or victimizer for all types of moral
transgressions. Interviewers observed for three sessions until no transgressions meeting
the criteria were observed among those children participating.
Smetana et al. (1999) did find a difference between maltreated and nonmaltreated
children's emotional conceptions regarding victimization. They found that neglected
children reported less sadness than nonmaltreated children when making judgments about
how hypothetical characters would feel. Additional differences were found based on
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gender. Physically abused boys reported less anger when being victimized than did
nonmaltreated boys across both hypothetical and actual situations. Also, overall, females
reported that hypothetical victims would feel more sadness in response to psychological
harm than did males.
However, no differences were found between maltreated and nonmaltreated
children's moral evaluations about hypothetical and actual transgressions. Both groups
judged the transgressions as being wrong and deserving of punishment. Smetana et al.
(1999) hypothesize that their findings may be due to the fact that affective and moral
responses are differentially organized or processed by children.
It is important to note some weaknesses with the Smetana et al. (1999) study. As
Smetana et al. note, one limitation is that there could have been unreported maltreatment
in the comparison group since low-income families receiving public assistance are a high
risk group. Also, the researchers asked the participants about the feelings of the victimizer
before asking about the feelings of the victim.

There could have been an order effect and

asking about the victimizer first may have influenced the participants to focus more on the
feelings of the victimizer rather than the victim. In addition, in the actual events condition,
some participants were interviewed more than others. Being interviewed more frequently
may have influenced them to respond differently due to "knowing what to expect." Also,
if the same interviewer was used each time, being interviewed frequently may have given
the participants a chance to form a "bond" or friendship with the interviewer which could
have influenced the responses they gave. While the Smetana et al. (1999) has a number of
limitations, it is important because it extends the research on the happy victimizer effect to
an abnormal sample that has received little attention in the literature.
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Further research is needed to explore the interrelation between affect and moral
evaluations, in both typical and atypical samples. More research also needs to be done
with a wider age range of children. The sample in the Smetana et al. (1999) study focused
on a small number of preschool children. It would be interesting to determine whether
older maltreated children would differ in their affective judgments or if their affective
responses would become more similar to those of normal children.
"Happy Victimizer " Expectancies: Developmental and Individual Differences
The Barden et al. (1980) study was the first to draw attention to the "happy
victimizer effect." They examined kindergarten, third, and sixth graders' emotional
reactions to a variety of different social situations. Children were asked if they would feel
happy, sad, scared, mad, or just ok (neutral) in the different situations described. Of
particular interest in the happy-victimizer literature are their findings for acts of dishonesty
in which the character in the story was not caught. They found that most of the younger
children expected to feel happy, while older children expected to feel scared or fearful.
A later study by these same authors, Zelko, Duncan, Barden, Garber, and Masters
(1986), revealed that there was a major discrepancy between how young children expected
to feel and how adults expected them to feel. Most of the younger children expected to
feel happy after an act of victimization in which they were not caught, but adults predicted
that they would primarily feel fear and sadness. Clearly, the adults did not anticipate a
reaction of happiness. Zelko et al. pointed out that this difference can make relations
between adults and younger children problematic. If adults inaccurately believe that the
young children will experience fear in these situations, their attempts to discuss moral
issues with children and to discipline children may be ineffective. For effective interactions
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to take place, it is important that adults accurately predict the emotional reactions of
children.
Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988) were the first to focus exclusively on the
"happy victimizer effect." They conducted a three-part study to examine the emotions
four- six-, and eight- year-old children attribute to a story figure who has violated a moral
rule. In the first part of the study, they attempted to replicate the findings of Barden et al.
(1980). The following two characters were presented: one who steals a bag of sweets
from another, and one who resists the temptation to steal. Participants were asked to
judge how each character would feel and to give justifications for their choices. They
found that the majority of younger participants (4- to 6-year olds) expected the character
who committed the theft to feel happy, while eight-year- olds expected a reaction of
sadness or fear. Younger subjects also gave significantly more outcome-oriented reasons
for their choices such as "the child got the candy he wanted." Older subjects gave more
moral reasons such as "it isn't right to steal."
In the second part of the study, Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988) manipulated
whether the character received a material gain and the salience of the harm done to the
victim. In one of the stories, the victim was shown crying and bleeding after being pushed
off a swing by the story character. Despite these manipulations, most younger children
continued to expect the victimizer to feel happy. In the third part of the study the
intention of the victimizer was examined. Do young children expect victimizers to feel
happy only when they intend to do harm to the victim? This expectation was the case.
In summary, Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988) found that younger children
(four- and six-year olds) expected a victimizer to feel happy and gave outcome
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justifications for their choices while older children expected a reaction of sadness or fear
and cited moral reasons for their choices.
Arsenio and Kramer (1992) did not find the dramatic shift described by NunnerWinkler and Sodian (1988). In their two- part study, they found the "happy victimizer
effect" to be more stable across a wider age range. In part one, participants across three
age levels (four-, six- and eight-year-olds) were read a story in which a child stole candy
from another child's locker at school. Participants were asked how both the victim and
victimizer would feel at the end of the story. They were given a choice of whether to
assess victims or victimizers first. Arsenio and Kramer (1992) reasoned that if the gain
received by the victimizer was most prominent, they would judge the victimizer first.
However, if the loss of the victim was more prominent, they would judge the victim first.
In addition, participants were asked to give an intensity rating for their judgment. For
example, participants were asked if the victim felt "a little sad, just sad, or very sad." They
found that all but one of the four- and six-year-olds and most of the eight-year -olds
expected the victimizer to feel "happy" or "good." Clearly, these results do not support
the major attributional shift described by Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988). However,
eight-year-olds who judged the victims first, expected victimizers to feel less happy than
did the younger children. Arsenio and Kramer (1992) noted that it could be possible that
rating the victims first made the eight-year-olds more aware of the negative consequences
of acts of victimization. This awareness may have moderated the happiness they attributed
to the victimizers. Arsenio and Kramer were careful to point out that order was not
experimentally manipulated and few definite conclusions could be drawn. They stated that
it is just as likely that those who rated victims first were more aware of the costs of
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victimization before the experiment was conducted.
Because of these unclear results, Arsenio and Kramer (1992) decided to
experimentally manipulate the pain or harm done to the victim in part two of their study.
Two manipulations were made. Victims and victimizers were described as friends, and in
one story the participant played the role of the victim and a known friend was described as
the victimizer. Additionally, a series of increasingly direct probe questions were used in
part two. These probes were used to see if the participant thought the victimizer could be
feeling anything other than the emotion initially selected. These probes were included to
address some of the methodological problems of previous studies. In many of the past
studies, children had to select a single emotion outcome (Arsenio, 1988; Barden et al.
1980), and in Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988), participants were not questioned any
further once they made their initial emotion judgment. Also, as Arsenio and Kramer
(1992) indicated, the probes were included because of the tendency of younger children to
select positive emotions and deny negative emotions. The probes would give the
participants a chance to indicate if they thought the victimizer could be feeling both
positive and negative emotions. Participants also were asked to explain why they chose
the emotion they did or to give a justification for their choice.
Almost all of the four- and six-year-olds continued to expect the victimizer to feel
positive emotions. However, eight- year-olds seemed to be influenced more by the efforts
to increase the salience of the harm done to the victim. They attributed fewer positive
emotions to the victimizer. However, slightly more than one half of their judgments were
positive. The friendship factor did not seem to play an important part. There were no
differences between the two conditions of victim and victimizers as friends versus
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participants being victimized by a known friend. The rationales or justifications revealed
that the eight- year-olds gave moral rationales more often than the younger children.
However, the eight-year-olds still gave outcome- oriented reasons in high numbers (58
percent for victimizers and 36 percent for victims).
Arsenio and Kramer (1992) found that almost all of the four-year-olds expected
the victimizer to feel happy or good even after the increasingly direct probes that drew
attention to the victim's loss. However, a majority of the six- and eight-year-olds (66 and
88 percent) responded to the least directive probe by selecting an emotion of opposite
valence from the one originally selected. Most of the older children originally expected
the victimizer to feel happy, but when probed further they selected a negative emotion
such as sadness or anger.
The results of the probing suggest that, for older children, mixed emotions play a
significant role. This finding may be due to older children's ability to understand that a
person can feel conflicting emotions such as happiness and sadness at the same time.
Younger children may continue to attribute happiness to the victimizer because of
cognitive limitations that prevent them from understanding that a person can experience
mixed emotions (Harter & Buddin, 1987; Harter & Whitesell, 1989). The results of
Arsenio and Kramer (1992) do not support the major attributional shift described by
Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988). However, their results do support a more subtle shift
from viewing victimizers as completely happy to an understanding that they may feel both
happy and sad.
Lemerise and Scott (1995) looked at the emotional judgements of children with
different peer statuses for acts of victimization. They conducted peer assessments on a

18

large sample of443 children to identify children's peer acceptance and aggression level.
Based on the previous research (Arsenio & Fleiss, 1996; Arsenio & Kramer, 1992), they
expected that both younger children and children who were more aggressive and/or less
accepted would have different emotional expectancies than the older, more-accepted
children.
Participants were individually interviewed and read stories from Arsenio and
Kramer (1992) that depicted two acts of victimization. The happy-victimizer effect was
confirmed. The majority of all children expected victimizers to feel happy and victims to
feel negative emotions such as sadness. However, older children expected victimizers to
feel less happy than did younger children. Older children were more likely to attribute
mixed emotions to victimizers, especially when questioned further. Younger children and
children with higher levels of aggression had more difficulty attributing mixed emotions to
victimizers. In addition, younger children and aggressive children were more likely to
explain their choice of happiness for the victimizer with references to the "joy of
victimization" itself. Clearly, younger children and aggressive children expected the
victimizer to enjoy the act of victimization.
Keller, Edelstein, Schuster, Fu-xi, and Hong (1996) studied the happy-victimizer
effect in a different culture to see whether it would be found in a non-western culture
where children are socialized differently. Chinese children from Bejing participated; they
were interviewed individually and read stories depicting moral transgressions. Participants
were then asked for a description of what happened (to check their understanding) and to
make an emotion attribution to the victimizer. In addition, they were asked how they
would feel if they were the victimizer in the story. Finally, they were to indicate how the
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victim would feel. They predicted that the Chinese subjects' moral development would be
more advanced than that of the Western subjects used in previous studies. However, they
still felt that the happy-victimizer effect would be found due to cognitive limitations on the
part of younger subjects. Based on their findings in the pilot study, it was also expected
that participants would differentiate between the victimizer described in the story and
themselves. It was predicted that subjects would attribute more positive feelings to the
hypothetical victimizers and more negative feelings to themselves as victimizers.
The findings for the hypothetical victimizer did not support the attributional shift
described by Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988). Instead, the happy-victimizer finding
seemed to be more stable across a wider age, range following the pattern of the Arsenio
and Kramer (1992) study when participants were given scenarios about hypothetical
characters. They found that 50 percent of all participants (with the exception of the fiveyear-olds) attributed negative feelings to the victimizer. No developmental trend was
found for the hypothetical victimizer condition.
For the self-as-victimizer condition, a different picture emerged. The majority of
all participants attributed negative feelings to themselves as victimizers. As age increased,
the pattern of attributing negative feelings to one's self increased. With age children
seemed to differentiate between hypothetical victimizers and themselves as victimizers.
The findings for the self-as-victimizer condition support a developmental shift. Overall,
the results indicate that the happy victimizer is a universal phenomenon. However, as
Keller et al. (1996) acknowledge, more cross-cultural studies are needed before any
definite conclusions can be drawn.
A later study by Van Zee, Lemerise, Arsenio, Gregory, and Sepcaru (2000) looked
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at some of the contextual influences upon the happy victimizer effect. A sample of 104
participants across three different grade levels was used (2nd, 4th, and 6th graders).

The

previous studies described had used stories only about hypothetical characters who do
physical aggression and receive a material reward as a consequence. In this study
participants were read stories with both hypothetical characters and stories in which
participants were asked to imagine themselves as the victimizer (the 2 interviews were 3-4
weeks apart). The order in which the two types of stories were presented was
counterbalanced. Acts of both physical and psychological harm were portrayed in which
the victimizer either received a tangible gain or no gain was received.
In the study, children did differentiate between themselves as victimizers and
hypothetical victimizers. Children of all ages attributed more sadness when they were
pretending to be the victimizer. When the victimizer was a hypothetical character,
children attributed less sadness and more positive emotions. Unlike the Keller et al.
(1996) study, no developmental trend was found for the self-as-victimizer condition, while
for the hypothetical condition, a developmental trend was observed. In the hypothetical
condition, younger participants attributed fewer negative emotions to victimizers and
required more probing than older children to attribute negative emotions. However, the
Van Zee et al. (2000) study looked at older children (8- to 12-year-olds) while the Keller
et al. (1996) study used younger children (5- to 8- year olds).
Goals of the Present Study
Arsenio and Fleiss (1996) found that behaviorally disruptive (BD) children reason
differently about acts of victimization due to problems with peer aggression and social
limits. The BD children expected victims to feel less fear than did normal children, and
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they also made more references to the material gains that the acts produced. However,
this study used only stories about hypothetical victims and victimizers. The current study
seeks to extend this research by examining how BD children reason about (a) themselves
versus hypothetical characters as victimizers, (b) acts of psychological harm versus
physical harm, and (c) acts associated with material gain versus no material gain.
The findings of Keller et al. (1996) support the conclusion that children
differentiate between themselves and others in making emotion attributions. Participants
in past studies on the happy-victimizer effect (Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Barden et al.,
1980; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988) may have judged the hypothetical victimizers in
the stories to be "bad kids" or "bullies." However, a limitation of the Keller et al. (1996)
study must be noted. Participants were always asked to rate themselves before rating the
hypothetical characters. A later study by Van Zee et al. (2000) did counterbalance the
presentation of the hypothetical and the self as victimizer scenarios. They found that
children across all age levels attributed primarily negative emotions to themselves as
victimizers.
However, both the Keller et al. (1996) and Van Zee et al. (2000) studies
examined the reasoning of normal populations of children. Little research has examined
the self vs. hypothetical distinction with a group of behaviorally disruptive children. Since
BD children engage in more aggressive acts than do normal children they may find such
acts more acceptable and therefore may attribute fewer negative emotions to themselves
as victimizers. Arsenio and Fleiss (1996) also found that BD children attributed less
sadness and fear to victims than did normal children. Because BD children often
underestimate the negative emotions victims may be feeling, they may not attribute
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feelings of guilt or sadness to themselves for engaging in such acts. However, it is difficult
to make a prediction because of the lack of research on the self vs. other distinction with
abnormal populations. In the present study, the distinction between how behaviorally
disruptive children reason about themselves and hypothetical characters will be explored.
Most past studies on the happy-victimizer effect have used stories describing acts
of instrumental aggression, in which children receive material gains. Arsenio and Lover
(1995) argued that children may expect victimization to produce happiness because a
desirable object such as a "candy bar" is obtained. They suggested that the "joy of
victimization" comes from the material gain received, not from actually doing harm to
others. However, Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988) found that young children (four
and five-year olds) expected victimizers to feel happy even when their actions produced no
clear gains. The Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988) study used a small number of
subjects, and it is unclear whether their results are relevant for older subjects because their
study only included children up to the age of eight years. Arsenio and Kramer (1992)
found that the happy-victimizer phenomenon is still present among older children.
Whether the happy-victimizer effect is due to the material gains involved remains
unclear. Do children expect acts of hostile victimization, in which the victimizer receives
no clear gain, to produce feelings of happiness? It is predicted that the reasoning of BD
children will more closely resemble that of younger children who tend to be more
influenced by the tangible gains involved because of their tendency to think in concrete
terms. Van Zee et al. (2000) found that for acts of physical harm, younger children
required more probe questions to attribute negative emotions in cases where a material
gain was involved. The research of Arsenio & Fleiss (1996) also suggests that BD
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children may be more influenced by the material gains involved as well. They found that
BD children explained the victimizer's emotions with more references to the material gains
that the acts produced. However, the older children who think in abstract terms may
focus less on the material gains involved (Piaget, 1954/1981). The present study will
address this question. The distinction between instrumental and hostile victimization will
be explored.
The difference between physical and psychological harm has also received little
attention. Do children view acts of victimization involving physical harm (e.g., punching,
hitting, kicking) differently from those involving psychological harm (e.g., teasing, name
calling)? Physical aggression is much more common among younger children and those
with behavioral disorders. The use of psychological aggression among children increases
with age (Mash & Wolfe, 1999). Because acts of psychological aggression become more
common during middle childhood than acts of physical aggression, younger elementary
students and those with behavioral problems may view psychological harm as not being as
"bad" as physical harm. Van Zee et al. (2000) found that by sixth grade children were
more willing to attribute negative emotions to victimizers performing acts of psychological
harm. This finding was consistent with other data that eleven to twelve year olds have a
growing appreciation of psychological traits and motivation (Damon & Hart, 1988). It is
hypothesized that behaviorally disruptive children may view acts of psychological harm as
being less negative or harmful than acts of physical aggression. However, no specific
predictions can be made because of the lack of research with abnormal populations.
Previous research with abnormal populations has used stories depicting acts of physical
aggression.
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Overall, it is expected that the happy-victimizer phenomenon will be stable across a
wide age range of children, following the pattern of Arsenio and Kramer (1992).
Participants will be asked to make judgments for themselves and hypothetical characters.
Stories involving instrumental and hostile aggression and physical and psychological harm
were used to examine potential differences.
Hypotheses/Predictions
In summary, the following was hypothesized or predicted for the current study:
1. The reasoning of children with behavioral disorders will resemble the
reasoning of younger children who are more influenced by the tangible gains
involved in many acts of victimization.
2. Children with behavioral disorders may view acts of psychological harm as
being less negative or harmful than acts of physical aggression.
3. It is expected that the happy-victimizer effect will be stable across a wide age
range of children following the pattern of Arsenio and Kramer (1992).

Chapter 2
Method
Participants
This study was reviewed and approved by Western Kentucky University's Human
Subjects Review Board (See Appendix). Participants were drawn from children admitted
to a local psychiatric hospital. The hospital, a 72 bed facility located in the South Central
Kentucky region, provides inpatient services to children and adolescents up to the age of
seventeen. Potential participants were identified through the intake process of the
admissions department. A folder was created for each new admission which contained
various documents that the parent or legal guardian reviewed and signed. During the
intake process, the admissions staff conducts an interview with the guardians, the child,
and any other relevant parties to obtain background and medical information on each new
admission. During this process, the parent or legal guardian was asked to give consent for
their child's participation. Children also gave their assent for participation before the
interviewer began the procedure (verbal assent for children younger than eight years and
written assent for children eight years and older). Consent was obtained on approximately
71 percent of children admitted according to admission records, cords.
Fifty-eight children participated (39 males, 19 females; 94.8 % Caucasian). The
age of participants ranged from six to twelve years (M= 10.57, Mdn = 10.96, SD = 1.88).
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Participants were grouped into three age groups with kindergarten, first and second
graders in the youngest group (N= 15, M= 8.12 years, SD = 1.14), third, fourth, and fifth
graders in the second age group (N= 26, M = 10.77 years, SD = 1.11), and sixth and
seventh graders in the third age group (N= \7, M= 12.42 years, SD = .46). There were
12 males and 3 females in the youngest group ( males Mage = 7.94, SD = 1.09; females M
age = 8.82, SD = 1.32), 19 males and 7 females in the second age group (males Mage =
10.99, SD = .94; females Mage = 10.18, SD = 1.38), and 8 males and 9 females in the
oldest age group (males Mage = 12.39, SD = .49; females Mage = 12.45, SD = .47).
These age groups are referred to as "grade level" groups below.
Participants' Aggression Levels
The hospital granted access to the information that was relevant to identifying the
severity of the children's aggressive symptoms. Information on whether the child was
having suicidal ideations, had a history of suicidal attempts, homicidal ideations, and/or a
history of homicidal attempts was reviewed. Whether current aggression was reported,
the frequency of aggressive episodes, and the severity of aggressive symptoms was also
included in the review. The educational history was another area of importance in helping
to identify the severity of behavioral problems. Whether the child was reportedly engaging
in behavioral problems in the school setting and whether they were receiving services as a
student with an Emotional Behavioral Disability (Kentucky's educational classification
terminology) was reviewed. The severity of behavior problems at school was coded in the
following way: 0 = no evidence, 1 = behavior problems noted at school, 2 = behavior
problems led to detention, 3 = behavior problems led to suspension/expulsion.
Information on admitting diagnoses was also included.
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An adapted version of a behavior checklist developed by Dodge, Lochman,
Harnish, Bates, and Pettit (1997) was used to rate the frequency and severity of children's
aggressive behaviors. See Table 1 for the specific behaviors listed on this rating form.
When determining whether the behaviors were present for each participant, raters
reviewed the information obtained during the intake interview. The behaviors on the
checklist were coded based on frequency and severity. The frequency of the behaviors
was coded the following way: 0 = no (behavior not present) or 1 = yes (behavior present)
while the severity of the behaviors was coded the following way: 0 = no evidence of
behavior, 1 = mild; 2 = moderate; 3 = severe.
After reviewing the background information on participants, it was found that 91.4
percent of the participants had recent aggression reported by parents or guardians.
Looking at gender, more male participants had reported aggression (38 of 39, 97.4 %)
than female participants (15 of 19, 78.9 %). For those who had current aggression
reported, 39.7 percent engaged in aggression daily, 15.5 percent on a weekly basis, 1.7
percent on a monthly basis, 5.2 percent engaged in aggression rarely and for 37.9 percent,
information on the frequency of aggression was missing from their intake interview. The
duration of the aggressive episodes varied with 36.2 percent engaging in episodes greater
than an hour, 6.9 percent engaged in episodes between 30-60 minutes, and 12.1 percent
had episodes of 15-30 minutes, 3.4 percent had episodes of less than 15 minute minutes,
and for 41.4 percent, information on the duration of aggressive episodes was missing. For
information on the percentage of occurrence of specific types of aggressive behaviors
listed on the checklist refer to Table 1. Regarding the participants' educational history,
79.3 percent had reported behavior problems at school with 36.2 percent having severe
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problems, 10.3 percent having moderate problems, 32.8 percent having mild problems,
and, for 20.7 percent, information on severity was missing.

Of the sample, 20.7 percent

were receiving special education services as students with Emotional Behavioral
Disabilities.
For each participant, a total aggression score was obtained by multiplying the
frequency by the severity for each specific behavior on the checklist (See Table 1) and
then taking the sum of these scores. The mean total aggression score for both male and
female participants was 18.19 with a standard deviation of 8.79. Male participants had a
mean total aggression score of 20.23 with a standard deviation of 7.62 (grade level 1= M
= 20.17, SD = 7.08; grade level 2 = M= 19.95, SD = 8.90; grade level 3 = M = 21.00, SD
= 5.63) while female participants had a mean total aggression score of 14.00 with a
standard deviation of 9.75 (grade level 1 = M- 14.67, SD = 10.07; grade level 2 =M=
12.29, SD = 9.69; grade level 3= M 15.11, SD = 8.94). The effects of gender and grade
level upon the aggression score were examined in a 2 (gender) by 3 (grade level)
ANOVA. Males had a significantly higher total aggression score than did females, F (1,
52) = 5.74,/? < .02, but there were no significant effects of grade level group, F (2, 52) =
.24,p > .05, or significant interactions.
For homicidal ideation, 29.3 percent of participants had reported homicidal
ideations, and 8.6 percent had a history of homicidal attempts. As regards suicidal
ideation, 55.2 reported having had suicidal ideation, and 5.2 percent had a history of
suicide attempts. Information on the participants' admitting diagnoses was obtained.
Participants had up to four admitting diagnoses. For the first diagnosis, the most common
diagnoses were Depressive Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (43.1 %), Impulse Control
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Disorder (24.1 %), and Oppositional Disorder (6.9 %).
All information obtained concerning participants was kept confidential and was
used only for the purpose of identifying participants who had problems with aggression.
Interviewers did not have any prior knowledge about participants. Only children with
parental consent participated in interviews.
Materials
Each moral transgression was depicted in a three-frame sequence of line drawings
with brief accompanying text. There were two sets of four stories. The set a participant
received was randomly determined. In each set, two of the stories described acts of
physical harm; in one of these stories the victimizer obtained a material gain as a result of
an aggressive act; in the other story there was no material gain. The other two stories
described psychological harm (e.g., teasing, insults). In one story there was no clear gain
for the victimizer, while in the other story, the victimizer received a gain as a result of
psychologically harming the victim. A three-point bar graph scale, with 3 being the most
intense and 1 one being the least intense, was used to aid participants in making judgments
about the intensity of the emotions they attributed to victims and victimizers.
Procedure
Participants were individually interviewed in one fifteen to twenty-minute session.
During each interview, participants were read four stories. The order of the four stories
was randomized. In one condition, the stories were written so that participants were
asked to imagine themselves in the role of the victimizer, and in the other condition the
victimizers were presented as hypothetical children. Participants were randomly assigned
to either the self-as-victimizer condition (imagining themselves as victimizers) or to the

30

hypothetical victimizer condition.
Participants were first read stories and shown line drawings depicting the stories.
After each story was read, participants were asked what happened in the story so that their
understanding could be checked. If participants did not fully understand what happened
in the story, the interviewer went through the story again until participants had a clear
understanding. Participants were then asked how the victim would feel at the end of the
story. After participants made an emotion attribution for the victim, they were then asked
how the victimizer would be feeling at the end of the story. Next, the participants were
shown the bar graph scale and asked to rate the intensity of the emotions they attributed to
both the victim and the victimizer. At this point in the interview, another comprehension
check was used to make sure participants still had a clear understanding of what happened
in the story and had not forgotten any parts of the story. Next, participants were asked to
give a rationale for each emotion choice. For example, if participants stated that the
victim would feel sad, they were then asked why the victim felt that way; a parallel
question was asked regarding the victimizer. Finally standard probe questions were asked
for both the victim and victimizer. Participants were asked if the victim and the victimizer
could be feeling anything other than the emotions initially attributed. If participants stated
that the victim and/or victimizer was feeling another emotion, they were then asked to
give both an intensity judgment and a rationale for the emotion choice as before.
Scoring
The emotions children choose for both victims and victimizers were coded with the
following numbers: 1 = happy, glad, good, etc.; 2 = scared, afraid, anxious, nervous,
worried; 3 = angry, mad, annoyed, frustrated; 4 = sad, depressed, hurt; 5 = guilty, sorry,
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regret; 6 = ashamed, embarrassed; 7 = mixed valence emotions (i.e., mixture of positive
and negative emotions), and 8 = other negative (emotions that do not fit into the
categories described above).
The intensity ratings for the emotions the participants choose for both the victim
and the victimizer were rated on the following seven-point scale: -3 very negative, -2 just
negative, - l a little negative, 0 neutral, 1 a little positive, 2 just positive and 3 very
positive. If more than one emotion was attributed to either the victim or victimizer, the
intensity ratings were combined to arrive at an overall rating.
Probe questions were used to determine whether the participant felt that the victim
and/or victimizer could be feeling anything else besides the initially attributed emotion.
The participants' responses to the probe questions for the victim were coded in the
following way: 0 = same valence emotion as attributed in the initial questioning or the
child said that the victim was not feeling any other emotion; 1= opposite valence emotion
was attributed. The participant's responses to the probe questions for the victimizer were
coded in the following way: 1 = mixed or negative emotions were attributed to the
victimizer in the initial questioning; 2 = opposite valence emotions were attributed; 3 =
same valence emotion as the one initially attributed; and 4 = no response (the child
indicated that the victimizer was not feeling any other emotion).
Participants were also asked to give a reason or a rationale for their emotion
choices for both the victim and the victimizer. The rationales provided for both the victim
and the victimizer where coded into the following categories: 1.1-1.6 (Moral Reasoning)
= moral reasoning such as references to the act being unfair, the act is unacceptable
because the individual knows that he/she would not like it if it were done to him/her,
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explicit references to the fact that the act would be likely to cause physical or emotional
harm, the actor realizes that he/she has done something that he/she regrets having done,
and references to implied victimization; 2.1 (Friendship/Relationship Concerns) = the
individual expresses concern about the act having been committed towards or by a friend;
3.1 (Self Focused Negative) = only applies to victimizers, the action caused a self focused
loss for the victimizer not having to do with material or psychological harm or the act is
likely to lead to adult sanctions and/or punishments; 5.1-5.4 (Prior Conditions) = act is
explained as resulting from some previous act, emotion, or relationship that was not
mentioned in the original story; 6.1 (Outcome Oriented) = the act is a realization of (or
failure to realize) the victimizer's intention or a loss of an object for the victim; 6.2 (Joy of
Victimization) happiness at the actual misdeed rather than any concrete gain; and 7.1
(Story Repetition/Restatement) = repeating of story words without additions.
Reliability
The coding of the information obtained on participants' history of aggression was
completed by one experimenter. To check the reliability, a second experimenter coded 25
percent of the information coded by the first experimenter. Cohen's Kappa was used to
calculate the obtained reliability. The mean Kappa obtained on all items of information
coded was K = .91.
The rationales given by participants were coded by one experimenter. The
experimenter then took 25 percent of the rationales and re-coded them to check reliability.
Cohen's Kappa was used to calculate the obtained reliability. For the victim rationales,
the reliability was K = .97 and for the victimizer rationales the reliability was K = .97. All
other information coded from the interviews was double-checked for accuracy by the
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experimenter.

Chapter 3
Results
Overview
Elementary-age participants at an inpatient psychiatric hospital were asked how
they expected both victims and victimizers to feel about acts of physical and psychological
harm in which victimizers either received a gain or did not receive an apparent gain for
their actions. Participants also were asked to give an intensity rating for the discrete
emotions chosen for both the victim and victimizer. The emotions were rated on a seven
point scale with a negative three being the most intensely negative and with a positive
three being the most intensely positive. In addition, participants were asked to give a
rationale for their emotion choice for both the victim and victimizer. Rationales were
coded into the following categories: moral reasoning, friendship concerns, negative
outcome for the victimizer, prior conditions, outcome reasons, and joy of victimization.
Finally, probe questions were used to find out whether participants felt that the victim and
victimizer could be feeling another emotion than the one initially selected. In addition,
Pearson correlations were obtained to determine if any of the above mentioned variables
correlated significantly with the total aggression score for participants. A significant
correlation of r (58) = .260, p < .05, was found between the quantitative emotion ratings
given for victims in stories in which the victimizer received a gain and the total aggression
score for participants. No other significant correlations (r's (58) < .221, p >.05) were
found between any of the variables and the total aggression score for participants.
A series of chi-square tests of independence were performed to test the effects of
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age, gender, and three experimental conditions (self versus hypothetical victimizer,
physical harm versus psychological harm, and gain versus no gain) on the discrete
emotions and rationales attributed to victims and victimizers since these variables were
categorical.
Mixed design ANOVAs with between-subject factors of age, gender, and self
versus hypothetical victimizer conditions, and within-subject factors of physical harm
versus psychological harm and gain versus no gain were used on the intensity ratings and
the responses to probe questions. Tukey's HSD tests were used to test significant
interactions that involved either within subject factors only or between subject factors
only. Repeated measures t tests, and independent t tests were used to test significant
interactions that involved both within- and between-subject factors.
Discrete Emotions Analyses
Attributions for victims. Children primarily expected the victim to feel either sad
or angry in both the self-as-victimizer condition and the hypothetical victimizer condition,
and there were no significant differences between the attributions made about victims in
these conditions. For the self condition, the following percentages of emotions were
attributed to the victim: 58.93 sad or angry in both the self-as-victimizer condition and
the hypothetical victimizer condition, and there were no significant differences between
the attributions made about victims in these conditions. For the self condition, the
following percentages of emotions were attributed to the victim: 58.93 for sadness, 36.61
for anger, 3.57 for mixed negative, and .90 for scared. For the hypothetical condition, the
following percentages of emotions were attributed to the victim: 61.61 for sadness, 25.83
for anger, 11. 67 for mixed negative and .83 for scared (see Table 2). In summary, 100
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percent of the emotions attributed to victims in both the self and hypothetical conditions
were negative in valence. Chi-square analyses on discrete emotion attributions to victims
failed to reveal any significant effects of condition (self versus hypothetical victimizer) or
for type of story (gain versus no gain). Also, within each condition (self versus
hypothetical victimizer) there were no significant effects of grade, but across conditions
there was a significant effect of grade, %2 (16, N = 227) = 23.37,/? < .01. Sixth and
seventh grade children attributed more anger to victims than expected, z = -2.42, p < .05.
Sixth and seventh grade children also attributed less sadness than expected to victims, z =
3.93, p < .001. Third, fourth, and fifth graders attributed more mixed negative emotions
to victims than expected, z = -9.46,/? < .001.
Self-as-Victimizer Versus Hypothetical Victimizer. There was a significant
difference between the discrete emotions attributed by children to victimizers in the selfas-victimizer condition and children in the hypothetical victimizer condition, % (8, N =
231) = 57.06, p < .01. Children attributed fewer happy emotions than expected to
themselves as victimizers, z = 7.85, p < .001. Children attributed more happy emotions
than expected when the victimizer was a hypothetical character, z = -4.15,/? < .001.
Children also attributed more sadness than expected to themselves as victimizers, z =
4.00, p < .001. Children in the hypothetical victimizer condition, attributed less sadness
than expected, z = 4.58,/? < .001 (see Table 2). In summary, children who imagined
themselves as victimizers attributed fewer happy emotions and more sad emotions than
expected. However, when children reasoned about a hypothetical victimizer, they
attributed more happy and fewer sad emotions than expected.
There was a significant effect of grade level for the emotions children attributed to
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themselves when pretending to be the victimizer (self condition), %2 (16, N = l 12) = 39.78,
p < .01. Kindergartners, and 1st, and 2nd graders attributed sadness to themselves as
victimizers more often than expected, z = -2.10, p < .05. Sixth and seventh graders
attributed guilt to themselves as victimizers more often than expected, z = 2.93, p < .01
(see Table 3). In summary, kindergarteners, and 1st, and 2nd graders attributed more
sadness to themselves as victimizers while 6th and 7th graders attributed more guilt to
themselves as victimizers.
Chi-square tests also revealed a significant effect of grade for discrete emotions
attributed to hypothetical victimizers,

(16, N = 118) = 23.70,/? < .05. Kindergartners,

and 1st and 2nd graders attributed less anger to hypothetical victimizers than expected, z =
4.14,/? < .001. No other significant differences were noted. Sixth, and seventh graders
did attribute fewer happy emotions than did younger participants, however, the difference
was not statistically significant (see Table 3).
There was a significant effect of gain versus no gain for discrete emotions
attributed to hypothetical victimizers, %2 (8, N = 118) = 18.81, p < .05. For stories in
which the hypothetical victimizer received a gain, children attributed more positive
emotions than expected, z = 3.15, p < .01. For stories in which the hypothetical victimizer
did not receive a gain, children attributed fewer positive emotions than expected, z = 3.37,
p < .001.

Participants also attributed less anger than expected for stories in which a gain

was received, z = 2.21, /? < .05 (see Table 4). In summary, participants attributed more
positive emotions when the hypothetical victimizer received a gain and fewer positive
emotions than expected when no gain was received. Also, children attributed less anger
than expected when the hypothetical victimizer received a gain.

38

Intensity of Emotions Attributed to Victims and Victimizers
A mixed design ANOVA examined the within-subjects effects of role (whether the
child was making attributions for the victim or victimizer), type of story (whether the harm
done was physical or psychological), and gain (whether a gain was received or not) on the
intensity of the emotions attributed. Gender, grade level, and condition (whether the child
was making attributions for self as victimizer or for a hypothetical victimizer) were
between-subject factors. A main effect of role, F (1, 46), = 56. 19, p < .001 was modified
by a significant interaction between role (whether the child was making attributions for the
victim or victimizer) and condition (self-as-victimizer versus hypothetical victimizer), F ( 1,
46) = 15.70, p < .001. Repeated measures t tests were used to examine mean differences
between the intensity of emotions attributed to the victim and victimizer in both the self
and hypothetical conditions since role was a within- subjects variable within each of these
conditions. Independent t tests were used to test the effects of condition for judgments for
victims and victimizers since condition was a between-subjects factor. Significance level
for these tests was set at p < .0125 to avoid inflating alpha with multiple tests. There were
significant effects ofrole in the self-as-victimizer condition t (27) = 6.13,/? < .01 and in
the hypothetical condition t (29) = 8.52,/? < .001 (See Table 5). In both conditions,
participants rated the victim's emotions as more intensely negative than those of the
victimizer. There was no significant effect of condition (self-as-victimizer versus
hypothetical victimizer) on judgments of emotion intensity for victims, t (56) = -.076,/? >
.40, but a significant difference was found for judgements about victimizers, t (56) = 5.35,/? < .001. Children in the hypothetical condition judged victimizers as feeling
significantly less negatively than did children in the self-as-victimizer condition.
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A main effect of gain, F (1, 46) = 4.27, p < .05 was modified by a significant
interaction between role and gain (whether the victimizer received a gain or not), F (1, 46)
= 5.02,p< .04. A Tukey's HSD analysis was used to examine this interaction. Children
rated victims' emotions as more intensely negative than those of the victimizer in both the
gain and no gain conditions (both at p < .01). There was no significant difference in the
intensity ratings for the victims' emotions in the gain and no gain conditions. However, a
difference between the intensity ratings of the emotions attributed to the victimizer in the
gain and no gain conditions was found with children attributing more intensely negative
emotions in the no gain condition (p < .01) (See Table 6).
In summary, children always rated the victims' emotions as more intensely
negative than those of the victimizer. Victimizers' emotions were rated as more intensely
negative when the victimizer did not receive a gain than when he/she did. Also, children in
the hypothetical victimizer condition rated victimizers' emotions as less intensely negative
than did the children in the self-as-victimizer condition.
Rationale Analyses
Participants were asked to give rationales for each emotion choice. For example,
if participants stated that the victim would feel sad, they were then asked why the victim
felt that way. The same procedure was used for the victimizer. The rationales given were
coded into the following categories: moral reasoning, friendship concerns, negative
outcome for the victimizer, prior conditions, outcome reasons, and joy of victimization.
Self-as-Victimizer Versus Hypothetical Victimizer. There was no significant effect
of victimizer condition for the rationales given for victims' emotions, % (6, N=232) =
5.94, p > .05, but there was a significant difference between the rationales children
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provided for themselves as victimizers and the rationales they provided for hypothetical
2

.

victimizers, % = (6, N = 242) = 49.36, p < .01. Children attributed more moral rationales
than expected for themselves as victimizers, z = -5.81, p < .001 and fewer moral rationales
than expected for hypothetical victimizers, z = 4.71, p < .001. Children responded with
more references to friendship concerns than expected in the hypothetical victimizer
condition, z = 7.98,/? < .001. Also, children attributed fewer outcome rationales for
themselves as victimizers than expected, z = 4.49,/? < .001, and more outcome rationales
for hypothetical victimizers than expected, %2 = 3.02,/? < .01. For the self-as-victimizer
condition, children gave fewer joy of victimization rationales than expected, z = 3.56,/? <
.001 (See Table 7). Overall, for the self-as-victimizer condition children responded with
more moral responses, less outcome-related responses, and less references to the joy of
victimization than expected. For the hypothetical victimizer condition, children provided
fewer moral responses, and more outcome- related rationales than expected.
Victims and Victimizers in Gain/No Gain Conditions. There was a significant
difference between the emotion rationales children gave for the victim in the stories in
which they imagined themselves as victimizers who received gains and in the stories where
they imagined themselves as victimizers who did not receive gains, %2 ( 6 , 1 1 2 ) =
16.95, p = .05. Children attributed fewer moral rationales to themselves as victimizers
than expected when a gain was received, z = 2.33, p < .05, and more moral responses
when no gain was received, z = -8.03, p = .001. For stories in which a gain was received
in the self-as-victimizer condition, children responded with more outcome rationales for
the victim than expected, z = -2.33,/? < .05 and for stories with no gain children
responded with fewer outcome rationales than expected, z = 8.07, p < .001 (see Table 8).
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In summary, for the self-as-victimizer condition, children attributed more moral responses
to the victim when no gain was involved for the victimizer and fewer moral rationales
when a gain was received by the victimizer. Children also attributed more outcome
responses for the victim than expected when a gain was received by the victimizer and
fewer outcome responses than expected when no gain was received by the victimizer.
For the hypothetical victimizer condition, there was a significant difference
between the emotion rationales children gave for victimizers in stories in which the
hypothetical victimizer received a gain and for stories in which the hypothetical victimizer
did not receive a gain, %2 (6, N = 129) = 21.74,p< .01, but the parallel analysis of
victimizer emotion rationales in the self-as-victimizer condition did not reach significance,
X2 (6, N= 113) = 11.54, p > .05. Children reported fewer references to prior conditions
to explain victimizers' emotions when a gain was received than expected, z = 2.38, p <
.05. Also, for stories in which the hypothetical victimizer received a gain, more outcome
rationales were given by participants for victimizers' emotions, z = -3.20, p < .01 than
expected; for stories with no gain, they gave fewer outcome responses than expected, z =
3.43, p < .001. For stories in which the hypothetical victimizer received no gain, children
also gave more rationales for victimizers' emotions relating to the joy of victimization, z
=15.58,p < .001 (See Table 8).
Physical versus Psychological Harm Stories. For the rationales given for victims'
emotions, there were no story type (physical versus psychological) effects in the self-asvictimizer condition, %2 (6, N=112) = 0, p > .05, the hypothetical condition, y2 (6, N =
120) = 4.16,p > .05, or across conditions,

N= 235) = 3.59, p > .05.

There was a significant difference between the rationales given for hypothetical
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victimizers' emotions in physical harm stories versus psychological harm stories, % (6, N
= 141) = 14.46, p < .05, but z-tests failed to reveal any significant differences. For the
self-as-victimizer condition, no significant differences were noted between the rationales
given in the physical harm stories versus the psychological harm stories, %2 = (6, N= 113)
= 2.89, ^ > . 0 5 .
Developmental Analyses. No significant differences between grade levels were
noted for the rationales children attributed to victimizers in both the self and hypothetical
conditions, y2 (10, N =113 or 119) < 15, p > .05. Children primarily responded with
either moral or outcome rationales across grade levels, and conditions (see Table 9). As
noted, earlier children in the self-as-victimizer condition responded with more moral
responses than outcome responses. However, their responses did not vary across grade
levels. In the self-as-victimizer condition, children consistently gave more moral responses
for themselves as victimizers across grades. Thus, no developmental differences in
emotional rationales for victimizers were found for either the self-as-victimizer or the
hypothetical victimizer conditions.
There were no significant effects of grade level for the rationales children
attributed for stories in which the victimizer received a gain in the self-as-victimizer
condition, %2 (10, N= 53) = 5.81, p > .05, or in the hypothetical victimizer condition, %
(10, N=59) = 4.59,/? > .05. No significant effect of grade level was found for no gain
stories in either the self-as-victimizer condition, % (10, TV =61) = 9.30, p > .05 or the
hypothetical victimizer condition, %2 (10, N=60) = 13.14,/? > .05.
For stories in which physical harm was done, no significant effect of grade was
found in the self-as-victimizer condition, %2 (10, N=56) = 12.70, p > .05, or the
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hypothetical victimizer condition,

(10, N =60) = 7.52, p > .05. Also, no significant

effect of grade was found for stories in which psychological harm was done, for either the
self-as-victimizer,

(10, N= 53) = 1.63, p > .05, or the hypothetical victimizer, %2 (10, N

=60) = 4. II, p >.05.
In summary, no developmental effects for emotion rationales were found by type
of story (gain versus no gain) or by the type of harm done (physical versus psychological).
No developmental effects were found in either the self-as-victimizer condition or the
hypothetical victimizer condition.
Probe Results
Children were asked whether the victim would feel anything other than the initially
attributed emotion (probe question). Their answers were coded to reflect whether
opposite valence emotions were attributed (1) or not (0). Across stories and conditions
the mean for this variable was .03, indicating that children rarely attributed opposite
valence emotions to victims after being probed.
Children also were asked whether the victimizer could be feeling anything other
than the initially attributed emotion. Their answers were coded as follows: 1 = mixed or
negative emotions attributed in initial question, 2 = opposite valence emotions attributed
after probe question, 3 = same valence emotions attributed at probe question, 4 = said
victimizers would not feel any other emotion than the one initially attributed. Thus, higher
scores indicate children had difficulty understanding that victimizers might feel a negative
emotion in situations of victimization.
A repeated measures ANOVA with within-subject factors of type of harm
(physical versus psychological) and type of story (gain versus no gain) and between-
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subject factors of gender, grade level, and condition (self victimizer versus hypothetical
victimizer) was performed on probe results for victimizers. A main effect of condition, F
(2, 46) = 3.78,/? < .04 was found with children requiring more probing to attribute
negative emotions to a hypothetical victimizer (M= 2.36, SD = 1.07) than to themselves as
the victimizer (M= 1.88, SD = 1.05). No significant interactions were found.
In summary, children rarely attributed opposite valence emotions to victims after
being probed indicating that the probe methodology did not "force" children to change the
emotions attributed. For the victimizer, children required more probing in the hypothetical
victimizer condition than in the self-as-victimizer condition to attribute another emotion
than the one initially selected.

Chapter 4
Discussion
The purpose of the current study was to extend research on the "happy victimizer
effect" to a sample of children with behavioral disorders.

One goal was to examine how

children reason about themselves versus hypothetical characters as victimizers. Little
research has examined the self versus hypothetical victimizer distinction with a group of
children with behavioral disorders. Since children with behavioral disorders engage in
more aggressive acts than do other children it was hypothesized that they may find such
acts more acceptable and therefore may attribute fewer negative emotions in both self-asvictimizer and hypothetical victimizer conditions. However, it was difficult to make a
prediction because of the lack of research on the self versus other distinction with
populations that differ from the norm.
In the present study, children did differentiate between themselves as victimizers
and hypothetical victimizers. For themselves as victimizers, children attributed fewer
positive emotions and more sadness than expected by random association. As in previous
studies, children attributed more positive emotions to a hypothetical victimizer than to
themselves as victimizers (Keller et al., 1996; Van Zee et al., 2000). Previous research by
Van Zee et al. (2000) examined this distinction with a group of elementary students and
found that children across all age levels attributed primarily negative emotions to
themselves as victimizers. For the hypothetical victimizer in the Van Zee et al. (2000)
study, children attributed fewer negative emotions and more positive emotions, and a
developmental trend was observed in the hypothetical condition with older children (sixth
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emotions to themselves as victimizers. For the hypothetical victimizer in the Van Zee et
al. (2000) study, children attributed fewer negative emotions and more positive emotions,
and a developmental trend was observed in the hypothetical condition with older children
(sixth graders) attributing fewer positive emotions than expected. The findings of the
current study and the Van Zee et al. study support the hypothesis that children may judge
the hypothetical victimizers in the stories as just "bad kids" or "bullies." When younger
children were imagining themselves as the victimizers, Van Zee et al. found they were
more likely to attribute negative emotions in the initial questioning and required less
probing to attribute negative emotions to the victimizer. Thus, even the younger children
in the Van Zee et al. study differentiated between themselves as victimizers and
hypothetical victimizers.
In the present study, a developmental effect was found for the self-as-victimizer
condition with first and second graders attributing more sadness than expected and sixth
and seventh graders attributing more guilt than expected. For the hypothetical victimizer,
children attributed more positive emotions and less sadness than expected. A
developmental effect was found with first and second graders attributing less anger than
expected to hypothetical victimizers. Older children did attribute fewer positive emotions
than did younger children to the hypothetical victimizer, however this difference was not
statistically significant; thirty-six percent of sixth and seventh graders still attributed
positive emotions. In earlier research (Van Zee et al., 2000) it was found that older
children (6th graders) attributed significantly fewer positive emotions to hypothetical
victimizers than did younger children. Additionally, older children in the Van Zee et al.
study were much more responsive to probe questioning than were the children in the
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present study, indicating that they understood that victimizers may experience mixed
emotions. Because the current sample had a significant history of aggression, they may
have underestimated the negative feelings of the hypothetical victimizer or failed to
recognize that a hypothetical victimizer may experience mixed emotions, simply labeling
the hypothetical character as a "bad kid" who enjoys engaging in such acts.
There was also a difference in the intensity of emotions children attributed to
themselves as victimizers versus to hypothetical victimizers. Children attributed more
intensely negative emotions to themselves as victimizers than to hypothetical victimizers.
Also, children attributed much more intensely negative emotions to victims than to
victimizers. This finding supports the research of Van Zee et al. (2000) who also found
that more intense emotions were attributed to victims than victimizers, and, similarly,
more intense emotions were attributed to the self-as-victimizer than to hypothetical
victimizers.
Participants also were asked to give rationales for each emotion choice for both
the victim and victimizer. The rationales were coded into the following categories: moral
reasoning, friendship concerns, negative outcome for the self, prior conditions, outcome
reasons, and joy of victimization. There was a significant difference between the
rationales children gave for themselves as victimizers versus hypothetical victimizers.
Children made more moral reasoning rationales for themselves as victimizers and fewer
than expected for hypothetical victimizers. Children also responded with fewer outcome
rationales for themselves as victimizers and more outcome rationales than expected for
hypothetical victimizers. For themselves as victimizers, children also responded with
fewer references to joy of victimization than expected. Overall, for the self-as-victimizer
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condition, children responded with more moral responses, fewer outcome responses, and
fewer references to joy of victimization than expected. For the hypothetical victimizer,
children provided fewer moral responses, and more outcome-related rationales than
expected. These findings for the rationales attributed to victimizers add support to the
finding that children reason differently about themselves as victimizers versus hypothetical
victimizers.
There was no developmental effect for the emotion rationales children gave in
either the self-as-victimizer or for the hypothetical victimizer conditions. Children
responded with primarily moral or outcome rationales across grade levels. In the self-asvictimizer condition, children responded with more moral rationales, and in the
hypothetical condition they tended to give more outcome rationales. However, their
responses did not vary across grade levels.
In the current study, it was examined whether children with behavioral disorders
would be more willing to attribute positive emotions when a tangible gain was received by
the victimizer than when no gain was received. It was predicted that the reasoning of
children with behavior disorders may more closely resemble the reasoning of younger
children who tend to be more influenced by the tangible gains involved. Arsenio and
Fleiss (1996) also found in their research that children with behavioral disorders explained
the victimizer's emotions with more references to the material gains that the acts
produced. The distinction between instrumental and hostile victimization also was
explored with children with behavioral disorders in the current study.
In the current study, a difference was found for hypothetical victimizers in the
emotions attributed for stories in which a gain was received versus stories in which no
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gain was received. Children attributed more positive emotions than expected to the
hypothetical victimizer when a gain was received and fewer positive emotions when no
gain was received. Additionally, children attributed less anger to the hypothetical
victimizer when a gain was received. For the self-as-victimizer condition, no distinction
between gain versus no gain was found. Children in the self-as-victimizer condition
primarily expected to feel negative emotions whether a gain was received or not. For
hypothetical victimizers, children attributed more positive emotions for stories in which a
gain was received and fewer positive emotions than expected when no gain was received.
The current research supports the hypothesis that children with behavior disorders may be
more influenced by the tangible gains involved in acts of victimization resembling the
reasoning of younger children when reasoning about hypothetical characters.
In previous research Van Zee et al. 2000 found that younger children required
more probing to attribute negative emotions to the victimizer for stories in which a gain
was received than for stories in which no gain was received. The current findings and the
research of Van Zee et al. (2000) raise the possibility that younger children and children
with behavioral disorders may be more influenced by the tangible gain involved in many
acts of victimization. Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988) and Arsenio and Kramer (1992)
also found that younger children gave more outcome-oriented rationales for their happy
victimizer attributions.
In addition, for stories in which a gain was received, children rated victimizers'
emotions as less intensely negative than they did for stories in which no gain was received.
In the Van Zee et al. (2000) study, no difference in intensity of negative emotions
attributed to victimizers in gain versus no gain condition was found. Clearly, the

50

participants in the current study appear to be influenced by the tangible gains involved in
acts of victimization. The current sample of participants have a significant history of past
aggression and may have had more personal experience in receiving gains from acts of
victimization.
There was also a difference in the rationales attributed in stories in which a gain
was received versus stories in which no gain was received in the self-as-victimizer
condition. When providing rationales for the emotions chosen for victims, children gave
fewer moral responses when a gain was received and more moral responses than expected
when no gain was received. Children also provided more outcome rationales for the
victim when a gain was obtained by the victimizer in the self-as-victimizer condition and
fewer outcome rationales than expected when there was no gain. Outcome rationales for
victims usually referred to the victim's loss (which was the victimizer's gain).
For the hypothetical victimizer, a difference in the rationales given for stories of
gain versus no gain was also found. However, for the self-as-victimizer condition, there
was no significant effect of gain versus no gain for the emotion rationales children gave for
victimizers. In the hypothetical condition, children made fewer references to prior
conditions than expected when a gain was received. Children also gave more outcome
rationales when a gain was received and fewer outcome rationales when no gain was
received for the hypothetical victimizers. In addition, children provided more references
to the joy of victimization when no gain was received.
In summary, children appeared to be influenced by the tangible gains involved.
Even in the self-as-victimizer condition, children gave fewer moral rationales for the victim
for stories in which a gain was received and more moral rationales for the victim when no
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gain was received. Children also gave more outcome-related responses than expected for
the hypothetical victimizer when a gain was received. This finding supports the research
of Arsenio and Fleiss (1996) who found that children with behavioral disorders explained
the victimizer's emotions with more references to the material gains that the acts
produced.
The difference between physical and psychological victimization has received little
attention in the happy victimizer literature. Physical aggression is much more common
among younger children and those with behavioral disorders. The use of psychological
aggression among children increases with age (Mash & Wolfe, 1999). It was hypothesized
that the reasoning of children with behavior disorders may be more similar to that of
younger children. However, no specific predictions were made because of a lack of
research with populations that differ from the norm. Previous research with populations
that differ has used stories depicting acts of physical aggression.
However, children in the current study did not appear to distinguish between
physical and psychological harm in contrast to the Van Zee et al. (2000) finding that
younger children (second and fourth graders) required more probing to attribute negative
emotions when the victimizer did psychological harm and received a gain while by sixth
grade children were more willing to attribute negative emotions to victimizers performing
acts of psychological harm. In the current study, no developmental trend was found for
the emotions attributed or rationales given in psychological harm and physical harm,
suggesting that the current sample may not clearly differentiate between the two different
forms of aggression.
Children also were asked if the victim and victimizer could be feeling any other
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emotions than the ones initially chosen. Children rarely attributed opposite valence
emotions to victims after being probed. Children required more probe questions to
attribute negative emotions to hypothetical victimizers than for themselves as victimizers.
For themselves as victimizers, children were more likely to attribute negative emotions in
the initial questioning and required fewer probe questions to attribute negative emotions to
victimizers which is consistent with previous findings (Van Zee et al., 2000).
The findings of the present study add additional support to the findings of previous
research on the "happy victimizer effect." As in previous research, the current sample of
children viewed hypothetical victimizers differently from themselves (Keller et al., 1996;
Van Zee et al., 2000). The majority of children across age levels expected to feel
negatively when imagining themselves as victimizers. However, for the hypothetical
victimizer, children attributed more positive emotions and less sadness than expected
supporting the hypothesis that children may view hypothetical characters as "bullies" or
"bad kids." Children in the current study also appeared to be influenced by the tangible
gains involved, attributing less intensely negative emotions in gain versus no gain
conditions and attributing fewer moral responses to hypothetical victimizers when a gain
was involved.
It should be noted that the current study had certain limitations. One limitation
was that the study used a relatively small number of participants from one geographic
region. Research on a larger, more diverse sample is needed before the results of the
current study can be generalized.

Another limitation is that participants were drawn from

one inpatient psychiatric facility. More research is needed at additional psychiatric
facilities to determine if the current sample is typical of children with behavior disorders.
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A possible idea for future research may be to compare an inpatient and an
outpatient population of children with behavior disorders to explore whether their views
on victimization would differ in the type or intensity of judgments made. Another idea
would be to extend the research of Smetana et al. (1999) who compared the emotional
reasoning of both maltreated and non-maltreated pre-schoolers. Since maltreated children
from low income families are a high risk group for developing difficulties with aggression,
the distinction between maltreated and non-maltreated children is in need of further study
with a wider age range. Overall, more research is needed to explore the interrelation
between affect and moral evaluations, in both typical and atypical samples.
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Table 1
Percent of Children Engaging in Aggressive Behaviors by Frequency and Severity As
Reported During Intake Interview

Severity Percent
% of Children w/Behavior

Mild

Moderate

Severe

Arguing, Quarreling

77.6

24.1

53.4

0.0

Cursing Swearing

60.3

60.3

0.0

0.0

Easily Angered, Irritable

79.3

10.3

69.0

0.0

Property Destruction
During An Argument

51.7

51.7

0.0

0.0

Physical Attacks out
Of Anger

81.0

0.0

19.0

62.1

Talks Back, Impertinent

82.8

82.8

0.0

0.0

Temper Tantrums

65.5

0.0

65.5

0.0

Animal Cruelty

24.1

0.0

0.0

24.1

Bullying, Teasing

67.2

8.6

58.6

0.0

Disruptive, Bothersome
Behaviors

84.5

79.3

5.2

0.0

Threatening Others

70.7

1.7

55.2

13.8

Vandalism

56.9

56.9

0.0

0.0

Other3

37.9

1.7

0.0

34.5

Behaviors

includes fire-setting and use of weapons.
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Table 2
Percent of Children Attributing Discrete Emotions to Victims and Victimizers in Self and
Hypothetical Conditions

Victims
Emotions

Self

Victimizers

Hypothetical

Hypothetical

Happy

0.00

0.00

8.00*

47.10*

Scared

0.90

0.83

0.00

0.00

Angry

36.61

25.83

20.50

18.50

Sad

58.93

61.67

58.90*

22.70*

Guilty

0.00

0.00

10.70

7.60

Mixed

0.00

0.00

0.00

2.50

Other Negative

0.00

0.00

1.80

0.80

Mixed Negative

3.57

11.67

00.00

0.80

Note. Significant as compared to the total expected percentage.
*p<M\.

Self
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Table 3
Percent of Children Attributing Discrete Emotions to Victimizers in Self and
Hypothetical Conditions by Grade

Condition
Self

Hypothetical

Emotions

K-2nd

3rd_5th

6th-7th

K-2nd

3rd_5th

6th-7th

Happy

3.10

14.60

3.10

55.60

50.90

36.10

Angry

12.50

31.30

12.50

20.00

27.80

Sad

75.00*

54.20

50.00

37.00

14.50

25.00

Guilty

3.10

0.00

34.40**

0.00

12.70

5.60

Mixed

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

5.60

Other Neg.

6.30

0.00

0.00

3.70

0.00

0.00

Mixed Neg.

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.80

0.00

3.70***

Note. Significant as compared to the total expected percentage.
* p < .05. * * p < .01. * * * p < . 0 0 1 .

66

Table 4
Percent of Children Attributing Discrete Emotions to Victimizers in Self and
Hypothetical Conditions by Gain/No Gain

Condition
Self

Hypothetical

Emotions

Gain

No Gain

Happy

12.50

3.60

Angry

16.10

Sad

Gain

No Gain

66.70**

27.60***

25.00

10.00*

27.60

57.10

60.70

15.00

31.00

Guilty

10.70

10.70

6.70

8.60

Mixed

0.00

0.00

1.70

3.40

Other Negative

3.57

0.00

0.00

1.70

Note. Significant as compared to the total expected percentage.
* p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Table 5
Intensity of Emotions Attributed to Victims and Victimizers

Condition
Self

Hypothetical

Effects

Victim

-2.830a

-2.725a

n.s.

Victimizer

-1.884b

- .017c

S>H*

Note. On victim / victimizer differences: Means with different subscripts are
significantly different from one another.
* p < .0125.
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Table 6
Intensity of Emotions Attributed to Victims and Victimizers: Effect of Gain/NoGain

Gain/No Gain
Gain

No Gain

Effects

Victim

-2.79a

-2.76a

n.s.

Victimizer

- ,49b

-1.34c

G <NG**

Note. On victim / victimizer differences: Means with different subscripts are
significantly different from one another.
* p< .05. **p<. 01
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Table 7
Percent of Children Giving Emotion Rationales to Victimizers in Self and Hypothetical
Conditions

Condition
Rationales

Self

Moral

77.30***

Friendship Concerns
Negative Outcome for Self
Prior Conditions
Outcome Reasons
Joy of Victimization

2.70

34.80***
1.50***

.90

1.50

1.80

4.50

15.50***
90***

Note. Significant as compared to the total expected percentage.
** p < .01. *** p < .001.

Hypothetical

44.00**
6.80

Table 8
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Percent of Children Giving Emotion Rationales to Victims and Victimizers in Self and Hypothetical Conditions by Gain/No Gain

Self
Rationales

Victim
Gain

Moral

69.60*

Hypothetical
Victimizer

No Gain
98.20***

Victim

Victimizer

Gain

No Gain

Gain

No Gain

Gain

No Gain

75.51

79.69

76.67

90.00

23.40

40.00

Friendship Concerns

0.00

0.00

2.04

3.13

0.00

0.50

1.60

3.10

Negative Outcome for Self

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.56

0.00

0.00

3.10

0.00

Prior Conditions

0.00

0.00

0.00

3.13

1.67

1.67

1.60*

9.20

22.45

9.38

21.67

3.33

0.00

0.00

Outcome Reasons
Joy of Victimization

30.40*
0.00

1.79***
0.00

0.00

Note. Significant as compared to the total expected percentage
* p < .05. ** p < . 0 1 *** p < .001.

1.56

64.10** 26.20*=
3.00

10.80
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Table 9
Percent of Children Attributing Rationales to Victimizers in Self and Hypothetical
Conditions by Grade

Condition
Self
Rationales

K-2nd

3rd_5th

Moral

83.90

Friendship

Hypothetical
6th-7th

K-2nd

3rd_5th

6th-7th

68.90

93.50

39.30

27.30

38.90

0.00

4.20

3.20

0.00

5.50

0.00

Prior Cond.

6.50

0.00

0.00

0.00

7.30

8.30

Outcome

9.70

25.00

3.20

42.90

50.90

50.00

Fear of Auth.

0.00

0.00

0.00

3.60

1.80

0.00

Joy of Vic.

0.00

2.10

0.00

14.30

7.30

2.80

Note. No significant effects were noted.

